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Abstract 
 
This project will investigate the development of 
biometrics as a viable security approach to counter 
terrorism and identity fraud. Related issues on 
privacy, performance assessments, deployment and 
standardization are discussed. Finally; the future 
directions of biometric systems development are 
explored. 
 
Introduction 
 
The explosion of interest in and use of biometrics 
technology is the quest for an ever more efficient and 
fraud proof means of authentication. Another has 
been the drive for better means of identifying 
criminals and terrorist suspects for law enforcement 
reasons.  Biometric technology is potentially hard to 
forge and it uniquely identifies a person, the 
contemporary solution to put to slay security frailty.  
Moreover biometric technologies have the advantage 
that they are tightly bound to the individual and 
cannot be easily used by an impostor. 
The term “Biometrics” and “Biometry” is derived 
from the words bio (meaning life) and metric to 
(measure) that have been in use since the early 20th 
century. Biometrics is divided into two types: 
behavioral (the traditional signature and voice) and 
physiological (face, fingerprint, hand, and iris 
recognition).  
It is evident that biometric solutions are finding 
places in various industries due to a litany of reasons 
ranging from ease of use to stronger security. 
However there is an enormous debate over the 
accuracy and benefits as well as the intrusive nature 
of some biometric technologies into people's privacy. 
Furthermore there is an element of uncertainty to this 
new approach; the question could be raised that 
companies or government agencies may have a 
hidden agenda to use these same monitoring 
technologies to monitor the private lives of law-
abiding citizens? Password and personal 
identification numbers can be illicitly acquired by 
direct covert observation by an intruder. There is no 
way of linking the usage or service to the actual user 
thus there is no means of protection against 
repudiation by the user identification owner. 
Passwords are by far the most used and most easily 
subverted method of personal authentication. This 
type of authenticity can be compromised in many 
ways, it can be forgotten, or carelessly written down 
on a yellow- post it note. The Smart card on the other 
hand uses methods that identify the user by a 
possession of a physical object that is unique to that 
user, or group of users. These are usually encoded 
with information used in the authentication process 
on a magnetic strip, a bar code, or a chip. However 
this can be easily exploited, be lost, forgotten, stolen, 
given away, or duplicated. Both methods may be 
used independently or in conjunction with one 
another, to further increase the security level of the 
system.  
There are a multitude of information security and 
authentication technologies to choose from and the 
selection process is often overwhelming to the 
customer. Selecting the right authentication 
technology or a combination thereof is indeed a 
complex matter. The decision in terms of 
functionality occurs on different levels. The 
following chart shows the different levels and one 
possible decision path see fig. 1. 
The key to a successful selection is flexibility and 
modularity; there is simply no single path - 
technology, biometrics, algorithm, interface or sensor 
- that works for all. 
One of the main drawbacks is that biometric as a 
contemporary solution is not clear enough to meet the 
needs of the companies’. They need biometric 
solutions that can be delivered quickly and can be 
easily installed.  
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Fig. 1 Various types of information security showing one possible decision path 
Source: Adopted from iosoftware.com [5]. 
 
 
Companies require a biometric solution that is 
compatible with existing infrastructure this will 
streamline cost when integrating biometric 
solution. Previous deployments that have been 
incompatible with the existing infrastructure have 
eradicated the companies IT budgets during 
development process therefore it is imperative to 
have the right biometric solution that is ready to be 
deployed with minimum in house development 
work. 
 
Choosing the right technology 
 
In the course of a year, millions of individuals pass 
through check-in desks at a large domestic or 
international airport, and many millions more pick 
up and drop off friends, family, and co-workers. In 
comparison, the set of airport employees is 
relatively small and constant therefore it is 
important to determine the right type of biometric 
technology used to authenticate the identities of 
people within these two different groups. For 
example, fingerprint/hand scanning can be use to 
identify/authenticate a relatively small flow 
constant group of employee at a control access 
point. Similarly, another usage for the finger 
scanning technology is to have the device built into 
a computer mouse (biometric mouse) with the 
software support for network security logons. 
However this will be expensive as it has to be 
implemented on to several computers [6]. 
Conversely, the advantage of voice recognition 
software is that it is centralized and able to support 
and manage up to several secure logon machines. 
Undoubtedly, face recognition has an 
overwhelming advantage over other biometric 
technologies, by being a touch-free biometric, and 
allies itself more easily with the human element of 
intelligence.  
Until recently the only way to attack security 
problems was adding expensive screening and 
administrating procedures steps include 
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maintaining accurate databases, reviewing identity 
documents and administrating password systems 
these methods have proven to be too costly and can 
be easily overcome by impostor. Biometrics offers 
more effective low cost solution that streamlines 
these conventional methods. Biometric Technology 
may be used to provide new services while 
maintaining high security, there are a number of 
vertical markets using biometrics such as 
government department deploying biometrics in 
passports national identification cards voter card 
and driving licenses. During the past ten years the 
science of biometrics has matured some what into 
an industry that offers real world solution to 
security problems [8]. 
Below is a comparative market share amongst the 
biometric technologies in 2004 which is compiled 
by the international biometric group. 
 
 
Biometric comparative market share showing 
finger scanning as the current leaders. 
Source: Adopted from the International Biometric 
Group [7]. 
 
Types of Biometric System and 
Processes 
 
There are two distinct of phases of operation for 
biometric systems; they are enrolment and 
verification /identification. The template is created 
during enrolment  process, the enrolment process 
may require the individual to provide multiple 
instances of biometrics trait for example, the 
unique identifier may be scanned or copied three or 
four times for comparison or to create a 
composition comparison template.  Identification 
commonly defined as a one-to-many (1:N) 
matching of a single biometric sample set against a 
database of samples, this entails that the users 
biometric trait is matched against all previously 
enrolled samples. Scores are generated for each 
comparison, and an algorithm is used to determine 
the matching record, if any. Generally, the highest 
score exceeding the threshold results in a match. 
The most comprehensive usage of these application 
devices occurs within the law and enforcement 
agencies in order to identify criminals and passport 
fraud.  Finally verification is defined as a one-to-
one (1:1) matching of a single biometric sample set 
biometric identifier record against another; this 
could be placing your finger on the touch pad or 
looking into the lens of the camera. Generally, the 
first sample is newly captured and the second is the 
enrolled identifier on file for a particular subject. 
The file sample is retrieved from the database 
based on a unique subject identifier such as a User 
ID. In a user authentication environment, a score 
exceeding the threshold would return a ‘match’, 
resulting in the authentication of the user. A score 
below the threshold would return a ‘no-match’, 
resulting in the denial of access. 
An important issue for the acceptance of biometric 
technologies is to measure the performance of 
individual biometric technologies in a credible and 
objective way; this is done through the use of 
sensors and algorithms. Matching is always based 
on probability, and the accuracy is generally 
measured by establishing the values for the 
following four criteria: FRR (False Rejection Rate), 
FAR (False Acceptance Rate), FER (Failure to 
Enrol Rate), and ERR (Equal Error Rate). These 
rates are usually expressed as events per 1,000 or 
10,000 uses therefore each biometric technology 
would need to adopt the following condition [1, 2, 
3, 4, 10]. 
False Rejection Rate and False Acceptance Rate 
are complementary in determining how stringent a 
biometric device is in allowing access to 
individuals. As a result, biometric devices include 
features to allow for variable threshold or 
sensitivity settings for each biometric technology 
and solution intended. For example, if the false 
acceptance rate threshold is increased to make it 
more difficult for impostors to gain access, it also 
will become harder for authorized people to gain 
access. As FAR goes down, FRR rises. On the 
other hand, if the false acceptance threshold is 
lowered as to make it very easy for authorized 
users to gain access, then it will be more likely that 
an impostor will slip through.  
Vendors usually provide a means for controlling 
the threshold for their system in order to control the 
trade-off between FRR and FAR. The Equal Error 
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Rate (EER) is the threshold level for which the 
FAR and the FRR are equal [9]. The EER is often 
quoted as a single figure to characterize the overall 
performance of biometric systems. From the tests 
carried out on finger, voice and face scanning it is 
evident that luminescent lighting, time and 
positioning of the face will affect the performance 
and accuracy of face recognition between different 
face acquisitions of the same image. Additionally, 
for voice recognition to remain optimal, the same 
handset, speaker and telephone number is needed 
for performance and accuracy to remain constant 
over a set time. Finally, finger scanning device 
must ensure that the scanning plate is kept clean so 
as to provide the necessary quality and standard to 
help reduce both false and accept error rates. 
Another area of concern is the high error rate that 
comes with the different fingerprint impressions 
from the same finger; this could prove to be 
problematic for all permissible users.   
It is important to note that some techniques, such as 
retinal scanning or finger print recognition, may 
offer high accuracy especially retina scanning 
whose accuracy is second to none, has a high data 
collection error rate and low user acceptability in 
both cases their deployment may not be appropriate 
for some applications. This is due to the high level 
of co-operation required by the user or the social or 
psychological factors that may prove unacceptable 
to potential users. Psychological factors include 
fingerprints, hand geometry, eye patterns, and 
facial features. Both voice and face recognition is 
considered to be easy to use and normally 
acceptable by potential users. However, their 
accuracy is currently less than some other 
biometric technologies, especially in unconstrained 
environments such as where the background sound 
and illumination is variable.  
Performance of a verification system uses the False 
Reject Rate (FRR) and the False Accept Rate 
(FAR). The perfect biometric system will produce 
zero error rate on both FAR and FRR 
measurements. On the other hand, if the system 
denies everyone the false-rate will be one and the 
false accept will be zero. Typically, systems 
operators can adjust a system parameter to achieve 
the desired FAR & FRR. Typically it is true to say 
that the desired measurement depends on the 
application and not the biometric device deployed. 
For a bank’s ATM, where the concern may be to 
avoid irritating permissible customers the FRR 
should be set low, on the other hand for a systems 
that provide access to secure area then the FAR 
should be of overriding concern. Typically 
biometric devices uses different FAR therefore it is 
difficult to compare systems that provide 
performance measurement [11]. 
 
Standardization 
 
In recent years, a lot of time and effort has been 
spent to put together a set of standards for the 
integration of biometric technologies in the form of 
Application Programmers Interfaces (APIs). The 
quest to hide the unique aspects of individual 
biometrics types is now forthcoming. The task of 
the API is to provide a generic interface between a 
software application that uses biometric technology 
and the technology itself. A set of standards was 
drawn up known as the Common Biometric 
Exchange File Format to help describe and 
interchange a set of data elements necessary, to 
support biometric technologies in a common way 
independently of the application (e.g., mobile 
devices, smart cards, protection of digital data, 
biometric data storage)[11]. 
The set of standards ensures system integrators that 
the pervasive adoption of biometrics science will 
no longer be locked into a single biometric 
technology, vendor, or product. Conversely some 
system integrators undergo extensive evaluations to 
be sure they pick the right biometric, and others 
adopt a wait and see approach.  
A standard API would allow an integrator to go 
forward with a tentative selection and 
programming facilitated by the API. Should the 
integrator later decide that another biometric would 
be more suitable, it could be substituted with 
minimal changes to the calling application. In 
addition to allowing substitution of biometrics, a 
common API would also provide for leveraging of 
a single biometric technology across multiple 
applications as well as allowing one application to 
integrate multiple biometric technologies using the 
same interface [11]. 
 
Human Authentication Application 
Programmers Interface- HAAPI 
 
The Human Authentication API was first 
introduced at the Tenth US Biometric Consortium 
meeting in December 1997. The specification was 
originally developed by the National Registry Inc. 
under contract to an agency of the US Department 
of Defence. The API was then placed in the public 
domain in hopes that the adoption of a generalised 
biometric API would lead to the interchange of 
 5 
biometric technologies and encourage the 
widespread distribution of biometrics in general. 
The HA-API attempts to hide, to the degree 
possible, the unique features of individual 
biometric types and products by providing a 
toolbox of biometric functions, which is accessed 
via a standard interface. The HA-API supports the 
deployment of multiple and layered biometrics and 
both local and server based verification. Currently, 
HA-API is defined for the Microsoft Win-32 
environment, with plans to expand it to other 
environments. The HA-API specification has 11 
function calls in 3 categories, as follows: 
 
• Biometric Technology Functions. There are 
many tasks carried out by the biometric 
technology function one of which lists the 
biometric devices i.e. (finger scanning iris 
scanning, face technologies etc) installed on a 
system. Another identifies which specific 
biometric technologies are available for use by 
the application. Additional function is used to 
initialize or release the biometric technologies. 
Furthermore the biometric technology that was 
released can subsequently be used again by 
calling the getBio function. 
• Biometric Authentication Functions. This 
function captures raw biometric data, specified 
by the Biometric technology. A sub function of 
biometric authentication functions carry’s out 
the tasks of processing the raw biometric data 
captured indiscriminate of its size. The raw 
data captured differs per technology, for 
example: Finger Imaging could be – a raw 
greyscale finger image; Facial Recognition 
could be a video image of a face; Speaker 
Verification could be a digitized speech 
waveform. The resulting biometric identifier 
record contains processed data and data size. 
The authentication functions also summarize 
the functionality of Capture, Process, and 
Verify in a continuous manner until a match is 
found or a timeout is reached. Another task 
includes enrolment and batch enrolment, 
which is facilitated by a wizard that provides 
the means for the application to ensure a 
successful enrolment.  
• Biometric Utility Functions. Biometric 
Utility Functions include the interface for the 
application developer to get and set parameters 
specific to a biometric device and releases 
memory used by a previous biometric 
function. The Utility function also displays the 
biometric properties dialog box, if it is 
available, to read and set parameters, which are 
specific to a biometric and their input devices 
[12]. 
This technology must be entered in the registry to 
make the HA-API aware of its existence. To 
register a technology, a vendor must first generate a 
unique biometric identifier (BUID). The BUID is a 
128 bit Global Unique Identifier (GUID). This 
value, along with the technology module (BSP) 
name and the technology name, must be stored in 
the system registry.  
 
Standards currently under development 
 
 Project 1603 ANSI/INCITS 395-
information Tel-signature/sign image 
based interchange format for Data 
Interchange. 
 
 ANSI/INCITS (M1/103-0620) -
information technology -hand Geometry 
Format for Data interchange. 
 
 ANSI/INCIS (M1-03-0351) Information 
Technology-biometrics performance 
Testing and reporting standard.  
 
 Recommendation for Electronic 
Authentication based on draft NIST 
special publication 8000-63. 
 
 ANSI/INCCITS 358-2002 information 
technology _ BIOAPI SPECIFICATON. 
 
 Federal information Processing standard 
(FIPS) -FIPS 197 advanced encryption 
standard (PES)-November 2001. 
  
Source:  www.ncits.org/tc-home/m1.htm(docs/m1 
docreg.htm [14].  
  
 
Discussion and Conclusion on the future 
of biometrics 
 
The European Commission has produced draft 
regulations to introduce, by 2005, biometric data 
(fingerprints and facial images) on visas and 
resident permits for non-EU nationals. The 
information would then be stored on national and 
EU databases that will be accessible through the 
Visa Information System held on what is called the 
Schengen Information System.  
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Perhaps it could be argued biometrics has little to 
do with combating terrorism and a lot to do with 
the demands of the law enforcement agencies for 
the surveillance of individuals where everyone is a 
suspect. Nevertheless, there are areas that need to 
be addressed such as cost in card production and 
the need for specialist readers, for registration. The 
worry of rejection rate, privacy advocacy groups 
advocating their concerns about who will be 
allowed access  to the ID card database and 
Scalability, the use of biometrics on this scale has 
never been attempted before.   
Against these motivations for tight social control, 
and an efficient identification scheme to support it, 
it is necessary to balance the interests of 
individuals in the various aspects of civil liberty. 
Analyzing the very principle of our democratic 
society’s there is noticeable excessive and overall 
surveillance which cannot be accepted for long, as 
private spaces in which people can move around  
freely from intrusions are being rapidly invaded by 
data surveillance technologies. These are the 
burning issues of concerns involving the 
deployment of biometrics and also in the light of 
international acknowledgment can compromise 
personal data and privacy principle as well as other 
fundamental values in our democratic societal 
order.  
One further aspect that our attention must be drawn 
to is how foolproof is biometrics? Biometrics work 
well only if the verifier can verify two things: one, 
that the biometric came from the person at the time 
of verification, and two, that the biometric matches 
the master biometric on file. If the system can't do 
that, it can't work. Let’s draw your attention to 
performance indicator namely the FAR and FRR 
error rates, an important barrier to active and 
passive biometrics technologies. A false negative 
rate of even one percent could allow at least one 
bad person to board a jet flight. Conversely one 
percent false positive rate could result in one 
innocent person on every flight being falsely 
matched to someone in a database of suspicious 
people. Another drawback is that optical scanners 
can't always distinguish between a picture of a 
finger and the finger itself, and capacitive scanners 
can sometimes be fooled by a mole of a person's 
finger.  Furthermore this may seem bizarre but 
which cannot be dismissed is the possibility that 
people may mutilate other people's body parts in 
order to use someone else's biometric identity for 
criminal purposes, for example, access to money, 
or buildings.  We may have hygiene issues; the 
need to place a hand or finger on a sensor plate can 
prompt fear about the spread of disease a 
requirement that makes some people uneasy. 
Viewing privacy as a human right not only 
reflected in the European Data Protection 
Directives 95/46/EC and 97/66EC or in Article 8 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights it is 
dealt in a wide range of areas and circumstances 
which includes video surveillance, telephone 
interception and bugging. 
 
Today’s solution for tomorrow 
problems 
 
The pervasive nature of biometric is becoming 
more noticeable in critical areas such as homeland 
security, finance and banking. The following are 
today’s solutions being developed or under 
discussion for deployment.  
Heathrow will be the first UK airport to carry out a 
large-scale trial of the iris recognition technology 
the aim is to speed up the movement of passenger 
through the terminal and detect illegal immigrants. 
It is reported that a Rap Scan Secure 1000 body 
scanner, a low-energy X-ray that goes beyond 
today’s metal detectors by beaming through a 
passenger’s clothes to reveal the outline of foreign 
objects next to their skin. It can detect metal, as 
well as anything inorganic. A school in Sunderland 
plans to use a retina scanning device to charge 
student for lunches in an attempt to make the 
school cashless and protect poor children who 
receive free food from being ridiculed. Bank of 
Tokyo Mitsubishi reported that it will introduce a 
new biometric security system for cash machines 
which can identify customers from the pattern of 
veins in their hands. A credit card sized passport 
with biometric chip to be developed as a prototype 
ID card, the trail to determine technical solutions 
and business case by mid 2004. The UK Passport 
Service is to develop a passport book that stores 
biometric details of the passport holder. A chip will 
contain a digitized photograph to improve security 
a six month roll out is due in 2005. 
The content of this project is extremely general, for 
this reason the project did not delve deep enough 
into the theoretical and practical aspects of FAR 
and FRR these are widely used methods to measure 
accuracy. Additional, more research was needed to 
establish a standard way for comparing two 
products of biometric authentication in an unbiased 
way. Also there is a pressing need to expedite the 
process of  standardization for both testing and the 
deployment of biometrics technology hence 
leverage security to counter real world security 
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problems in both finance and homeland security 
sectors.  Finally, addressing the issues surrounding 
biometrics and the effect it has on privacy we must 
accept that both are not conflicting aims but 
parallel goals worth fighting for.  
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